DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE (DFIA) AFLOAT INHERITANCE MODEL (AIM) FOR RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF):

UNCLASSIFIED//

ROUTINE

R 132106Z JAN 21 MID200000548782U

FM CNO WASHINGTON DC

TO NAVADMIN

INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC

BT
UNCLAS

NAVADMIN 006/21

PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N2N6//

MSGID/NAVADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N2N6/JAN//

SUBJ/DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE (DFIA) AFLOAT 
INHERITANCE MODEL (AIM) FOR RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF)//

REF/A/DOC/DFIA/8MAR18//

REF/B/DOC/NAVSYSCOM/19SEP17//

NARR/REF A IS THE INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) TECHNICAL AUTHORITY (TA) 
DEFENSE-IN -DEPTH FUNCTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE STANDARD (IATA-STD-
004-DFIA) V4.0.  REF B IS THE IA TA NAVAL SYSTEMS COMMAND ENCLAVE PROCESS 
V1.0.
POC/BROOKE ZIMMERMAN/GS-15/N2N6D6/EMAIL:  brooke.zimmerman@navy.mil/TEL:  
571 -256-8521// TECHNICAL POC/MEGAN CANE/NH-4/EMAIL:  
megan.cane@navy.mil/TEL:  202-781 -3835//

1.  This NAVADMIN authorizes use of the Defense-in-Depth Functional 
Implementation Architecture (DFIA) security framework while executing the 
Risk Management Framework (RMF) for afloat systems, as outlined in references 
(a) and (b), to reduce the workload for RMF documentation by enhancing 
opportunities for reciprocity and enabling transparency for authorized 
systems, as well as minimizing total cost.  To date, security inheritance in 
risk management has been ad hoc, site specific, and manual.  Implementation 
of DFIA utilizing an Afloat Inheritance Model (AIM) will provide a set of 
common inheritable controls for authorization and accreditation of Navy 
Afloat systems.

2.  Applicable to all Navy systems fielded on ships and submarines, this 
approach enables system owners to focus on addressing the technical and non -
technical controls for which they are responsible and have the authority to 
implement.

3.  Common inherited security controls are a means for connected systems to 
satisfy established security requirements through parent/child relationships 
with Common Control Providers (CCP).  The CCP is responsible and accountable 
for ensuring these controls are properly assessed and their compliance is 
maintained.

4.  During the RMF process, system owners are to utilize AIM in a risk-
balanced, cost-effective manner in determining the security requirements at 
each defensive layer in afloat platforms and be included in the initial 
platform security architecture.  Future updates to reference (a) and AIM will 
provide additional inheritable controls and address future requirements, such 
as Navys Integrated Network Operation Command and Controls System (INOCCS).

5.  References (a) and (b) and other relevant documents are located at:
https://portal.secnav.navy.mil/orgs/OPNAV/N2N6/DDCION/N2N6BC4/RMF/SitePages
/Inheritance%20Models.aspx

6.  This NAVADMIN will remain in effect until cancelled or superseded.

7.  Released by VADM Jeffrey E. Trussler, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
for Information Warfare, OPNAV N2N6.//

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