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INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N2N6//
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N2N6/SEP//
SUBJ/U.S. NAVY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF NAVY COMMANDS,
FLEETS, AND BASES, STATIONS AND INSTALLATIONS//
REF/A/DOC/ONI/FITDON/2019//
REF/B/DOC/US CODE TITLE 50/2011//
REF/C/DOC/EO 12333/2008//
REF/D/DOC/SECNAV/SECNAVINST 3850.2E/2017//
REF/E/DOC/USDI/DODD 5240.02/2015//
REF/F/DOC/SECNAV/SECNAVINST 5430.107A/2019//
REF/G/DOC/CNO/OPNAVINST 5450.353A/2019//
REF/H/DOC/CJCS/CJCSI 3241.01A/2013//
REF/I/DOC/USDI/DODI 5240.10/2020//
REF/J/DOC/USDI/S-DODI 5240.17/2014//
NARR/REF A IS THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT TO DEPARTMENT OF NAVY (FIT DON)
ANNUAL PUBLICATION.
REF B IS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 50 WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE.
REF C IS AN EXECUTIVE ORDER GOVERNING UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REF D IS SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION ON DEPARTMENT OF THE
NAVY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHICH PROVIDES POLICY AND DEFINES SPECIFIC
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE NAVY.
REF E IS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, WHICH
PROVIDES POLICY AND ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONDUCTING CI ACTIVITIES IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
REF F IS SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION ON THE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF
THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.
REF G IS THE NAVY INSTRUCTION ON THE MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND TASKS OF THE
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY.
REF H IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.
REF I IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION ON THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN
THE DOD COMPONENTS.
REF J IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.//
RMKS/1. Per reference (a), the U.S. Navy is a key target for Foreign
Intelligence Entities (FIEs) collection efforts to steal our significant
technical advantage over our competitors and degrade our strategic lethal
overmatch of our adversaries. DON counterintelligence (CI) components (U.S.
Navy CI, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) CI and Naval Criminal Investigation Service
(NCIS)) and the Intelligence Community (IC) conduct CI activities to identify
FIE efforts to target sensitive and classified information pertaining to
Department of the Navy (DON) technology, plans, order of battle,
capabilities, and intentions.
2. Authority. Per references (b) through (d), the commanders and heads of
the intelligence and CI elements of the Navy will: (1) collect (including
through clandestine means), produce, analyze and disseminate defense and
defense-related intelligence and CI to support departmental requirements,
and, as appropriate, national requirements; (2) conduct CI activities; (3)
monitor the development, procurement and management of intelligence systems
and equipment; and (4) conduct military intelligence liaison
relationships. Specifically, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) has authorized
Navy CI personnel to conduct authorized CI activities on behalf of the
command to which they are assigned under the authority, direction, and
control of the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Activities include: CI
Analysis and Production (CI A&P), CI Collection Activities (CCA), CI
Functional Services (CIFS), and support to NCIS CI Investigations and NCIS
Advanced Offensive CI Operations (OFCO).
3. Responsibility and Tasks. Per references (d) and (e), CI activities will
be undertaken as part of an integrated DOD and national effort. The Navy
will integrate CI activities into all operations, programs, systems,
exercises, plans, doctrine, strategies, policies, and architectures to
detect, identify, assess, exploit, and deny FIE and their insiders targeting
or exploiting DON information, personnel, operations and other
activities. Navy CI elements will conduct CI A&P; CIFS; CCA; and support to
NCIS Advanced CI Operations and NCIS CI Investigations. Per references (d)
and (f), NCIS is identified as the Military Department Counterintelligence
Organization (MDCO) and in that role, they are the sole DON CI component
authorized to conduct CI Investigations of DON personnel.
4. Coordination. Per reference (g), the Naval Intelligence Activity (NIA)
serves as the Executive Agent and Functional Manager for Navy CI and Human
Intelligence (HUMINT). The Navy CI Coordinating Authority (NCICA) under the
authority, direction, and control of the DNI will coordinate, deconflict and
synchronize CI activities executed by U.S. Navy CI personnel or on behalf of
the Service. Per reference (h), if expressly stated in a Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) approved plan or order, the Combatant Commander assumes and
exercises Operational Control over CI forces assigned or attached. Where
there is no SECDEF approved plan or order being executed, CI elements and
activities remain under the command and control of the Service. In all
instances, both the U.S. Navy CICA and the affected Combatant Command CICA
should be part of the coordination, deconfliction and synchronization of
Service CI activities. All U.S. Navy CI Inquiries, also called CI Incident
Assessments (CIIAs), will be coordinated and deconflicted with NCIS before
initiating to determine the MDCO level of interest in opening an
investigation on the basis of the initial information. If there is
insufficient grounds to open an investigation, a CI Inquiry will be initiated
to determine if there is a foreign nexus. If during the conduct of the CI
Inquiry information of a criminal nature is discovered, the CI Inquiry will
be halted and the information immediately provided to NCIS. All information
identified during the conduct of U.S. Navy CI activities found to be of an
investigative nature will be passed to NCIS via the Secret Intranet Protocol
Router Network (SIPR) Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center
(SCLEOC).
5. CI Support. All Navy CI support activities in support of Navy commands
will be conducted as per reference (d) and coordinated through the
NCICA. Requests for CI support should be coordinated with Fleet N2X
components and concerned organization Commanders to ensure the capability is
employed under the appropriate command and CI authorities. Due to the
dynamic nature of CI activities, requests for CI support will require NIA
validation. Support requests will not be used as augmentation for Maritime
Operations Centers or Maritime Intelligence Operations Centers, numbered
Fleet staffs or to off-set/compensate for permanently assigned personnel,
individual augmentation shortfalls, or Global Force Management Request for
Forces.
6. CI Analysis and Production (CI A&P). The U.S. Navy will develop analytic
products to address the threat posed by espionage, international terrorism,
subversion, sabotage, assassination, and covert activities. This includes
other activities that have a FIE nexus. CI analysis enhances the
understanding of the intentions of an FIE, foreign security service, an
international terrorist entity, or other foreign actors and provides
indications of their limitations, plans, and warning intentions. CI A&P also
supports other CI functions of CIFS, CCA, CI Investigations and CI as well as
support to U.S. Navy foreign intelligence activities. This includes, but is
not limited to, analysis for offensive CI operations, investigative lead
development, threats to personnel and property, threats to the security of
DON forces and operations, and foreign intelligence collection against DoD
technology, information systems, and infrastructure.
7. CI Functional Services (CIFS). CIFS are CI activities conducted to
support the four DOD CI missions and that enable one or more of the other CI
functions. Per reference (i), CIFS include, but are not limited to: (1) CI
Awareness and Reporting briefings; (2) support to arms control and other
international treaties; (3) support to antiterrorism and force protection;
(4) support to military operations and training exercises; (5) support to war
planning; (6) support to foreign visitor programs; (7) CI inquiries (also
known as CIIAs); (8) liaison and collection activities not associated with
CCA; (9) CI training; (10) CI surveillance and surveillance detection; (11)
CI insider threat identification and mitigation efforts; (12) CI support to
OPSEC programs; (13) CI support to HUMINT collection, asset validation, and
enabling activities; (14) CI support to research, development, and
acquisition to include support to Supply Chain Risk Management; (15) CI
support to counter-proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction;
(16) CI support to critical infrastructure protection; (17) CI support to
security programs; (18) CI support to the Military Accessions Vital to the
National Interest Program; (19) CI support to foreign award nominations; (20)
CI support in the screening of contract linguist personnel, and local
national personnel hired by DoD in overseas locations; and (21) CI support to
cyber operations. Specialized technical CIFS of Polygraph and credibility
assessment support, and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures can only be
conducted by NCIS. Route requests for specialized technical CIFS support with
local NCIS Field Office and coordinate through NCICA.
8. CI Collection Activities (CCA). U.S. Navy CI elements conduct CCA to
acquire information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of FIE
and their insiders who engage in espionage, terrorism, sabotage, subversion,
and clandestine intelligence activities directed against the United States,
DOD and the DON. Per reference (j), CCA includes Military CI Collection, CI
Questioning of Enemy Prisoners of War and Detainees, CI Debriefs, CI Liaison,
Open Source and Media Exploitation, and CI Collection in Cyberspace.
9. The U.S. Navy executes CI as a Service responsibility and a function of
command, not unlike Operational Security (OPSEC) or force protection. Navy
CI Agents are a force multiplier for the DON, working closely with Marine
Corps CI Agents, and freeing up NCIS limited assets to focus on executing
advanced CI Operations and CI Investigations for which NCIS has unique
authorities and placement to perform.
10. Released by VADM Jeffrey E. Trussler, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Information Warfare, OPNAV N2N6.//
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