INSIDER THREAT TO CYBER SECURITY (ITCS) (CORRECTED COPY) UNCLASSIFIED/ FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N2N6// TO NAVADMIN INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC UNCLAS NAVADMIN 319/13 (CORRECTED COPY) MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/DEC...:
1 NAVADMINs are known that
refer back to this one:
NAVADMIN ID |
Title |
NAVADMIN 319/13 (CORRECTED COPY) |
|
UNCLASSIFIED//
ATTENTION INVITED TO
ROUTINE
R 132027Z DEC 13 PSN 793966K40
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
INFO ZEN/CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
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SUBJ: INSIDER THREAT TO CYBER SECURITY (ITCS) (CORRECTED COPY) UNCLASSIFIED/
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N2N6// TO NAVADMIN INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC UNCLAS
NAVADMIN 319/13 (CORRECTED COPY)
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/DEC//
SUBJ/INSIDER THREAT TO CYBER SECURITY (ITCS) - CORRECTED COPY//
REF/A/MSG/CNO WASHINGTON DC/132027ZDEC13//
REF/B/DOC/EO 13587/20111007//
REF/C/DOC/SECNAVINST/20130808//
REF/D/DOC/DODD 5240.06/20133005//
REF/E/MSG/CTO 13-16/231312Z AUG 13//
REF/F/MSG/201923Z NOV 13//
REF/G/MSG/062137Z DEC 13//
NARR/REF A IS NAVADMIN 319/13. REF B IS THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER TO
IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING AND
SAFEGUARDING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. REF C IS THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
INSTRUCTION ON THE INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM. REF D IS THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DIRECTIVE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AWARENESS AND REPORTING (CIAR).
REF E IS THE CTF 1010 COMMUNICATIONS TASKING ORDER (CTO) 13-16 DIRECTING
INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION ACTIONS. REF F IS THE NAVINTEL SCI INFORMATION
ASSURANCE AND SECURITY DIRECTION FOR INSIDER THREAT MITIGATION AND OVERSIGHT
OF PRIVILEGED USERS. REF G IS NAVADMIN 309/13, PERSONAL FOR - SECURITY RISK
MITIGATION.//
RMKS/1. THIS NAVADMIN CANCELS REF A.
2. THIS NAVADMIN PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF OUR
CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION, NETWORKS, AND SYSTEMS FROM THE
INCREASING RISK OF INSIDER THREATS. IT IS CRITICAL THAT COMMANDERS TAKE
IMMEDIATE ACTION TO MITIGATE THIS THREAT.
3. DEFINITION. PER DOD GUIDANCE AND REF B, AN INSIDER THREAT IS "A PERSON
WITH AUTHORIZED ACCESS, WHO USES THAT ACCESS, WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY, TO
HARM NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OR NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE, DATA MODIFICATION, ESPIONAGE, TERRORISM, OR KINETIC ACTIONS
RESULTING IN LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF RESOURCES OR CAPABILITIES."
4. GUIDANCE. RECENT HIGH-PROFILE DISCLOSURES INVOLVING U.S. SERVICE
MEMBERS, CIVILIANS, AND CONTRACTORS HIGHLIGHT THE NEED TO ACTIVELY AND
CONTINUOUSLY DETECT, DETER, AND MITIGATE THREATS FROM THOSE WHO HAVE
AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO OUR FACILITIES, NETWORKS AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION. I
EXPECT ALL COMMANDERS TO PRIORITIZE THIS ISSUE AND IMPLEMENT THE GUIDANCE
REFERENCED ABOVE TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL INSIDER THREATS WITHIN YOUR COMMANDS.
5. THE DIRECTOR OF THE NAVY STAFF (DNS) SERVES AS THE OVERALL OPNAV LEAD
FOR NAVY INSIDER THREAT. THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR
INFORMATION DOMINANCE (OPNAV N2/N6) LEADS A FOCUSED EFFORT TO ASSURE THE
SECURITY OF OUR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND NETWORKS. OPNAV
N2/N6 ESTABLISHED THE INSIDER THREAT TO CYBER SECURITY (ITCS) OFFICE CHARGED
WITH OVERSEEING ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO MITIGATE OR DETER THREATS TO OUR
NETWORKS AND SYSTEMS FROM AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL. ITCS WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH
FLEET CYBER COMMAND/COMMANDER TENTH FLEET (FCC/C10F), NCIS, THE OFFICE OF
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (ONI) AND OTHER APPROPRIATE COMMANDS TO DETER, DETECT
AND MITIGATE INSIDER THREATS TO OUR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
6. BELOW ARE IMMEDIATE NAVY ACTIONS DESIGNED TO REDUCE THREATS TO
CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM INSIDERS.
- REDUCING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PRIVILEGED USERS WITH SYSTEM
ADMINISTRATORS' ACCESS TO NAVY NETWORKS.
- IMPLEMENTING A RANDOM POLYGRAPH PROGRAM FOR PRIVILEGED USERS.
- IMPLEMENTING ANOMALY DETECTION CAPABILITIES ON OUR SENSITIVE NETWORKS
AND SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR OR ACTIVITY.
- ESTABLISHING A CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM FOR CLEARANCE
ADJUDICATION, BEGINNING WITH PRIVILEGED USERS.
- DEPLOYING AND MONITORING THE REQUIREMENTS OF REFS D AND E AND OTHER
DOD AND IC PRIVILEGED USER AND REMOVABLE MEDIA DIRECTIVES.
7. INSIDER THREATS DIRECTLY IMPERIL OUR WARFIGHTING EFFECTIVENESS AND
DEGRADE OUR READINESS. THIS IS AN ALL HANDS EFFORT. I EXPECT ALL
COMMANDERS TO REVIEW THE ABOVE REFERENCES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO ADDRESS
POTENTIAL INSIDER THREATS WITHIN YOUR COMMANDS. EVERY SAILOR, CIVILIAN, AND
CONTRACTOR IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF NAVY INFORMATION,
INCLUDING PROTECTING IDENTIFICATION AND ACCESS CARDS, PASSWORDS, CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION, SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION, AND OPERATIONAL EMAILS.
NAVY PERSONNEL WILL ALSO EXPEDITIOUSLY REPORT SECURITY INCIDENTS AND
VIOLATIONS IAW ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES TO THEIR SECURITY MANAGERS OR CHAIN OF
COMMAND. SIMPLY PUT, IF YOU SEE SOMETHING THAT DOESN'T LOOK RIGHT, SAY
SOMETHING TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY.
8. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE NAVY INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM, MANDATORY
REPORTABLE INDICATORS, AND ANONYMOUS REPORTING METHODS, VISIT THE NCIS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND INSIDER THREAT AWARENESS WEBPAGE AT
HTTP://WWW.NCIS.NAVY.MIL/COREMISSIONS/CI/PAGES/DEFAULT.AS
PX. POC FOR THIS ACTION IS: MR. GARY FAGAN, OPNAV N2/N6, 703-604-5032;
DSN: 664.
9. RELEASED BY VICE ADMIRAL TED N. BRANCH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE (N2/N6).//
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